POPE FRANCIS - A HERETIC? ON THE PUNISHMENT OF HERETICS AND ESPECIALLY OF THE POPE WHO HAS BECOME A HERETIC WILLIAM OF OCKHAM Dial. 6 CHP. XXXII

Chapter 32

Student: This last reason seems to fail in three respects. Firstly, because the cited authorities do not refer to all Christians but only to the prelates who have the duty to punish a wrong done to God. Secondly, because if the reason were conclusive it would prove that it was necessary for any catholic to appeal from such a sentence, just as any catholic is bound to punish a wrong due to God. Thirdly, because it would follow therefrom that any criminal, excommunicated and disgraced individual might appeal from such a sentence, just as any criminal, excommunicated and disgraced individual may seek redress for personal injury received, indeed even an enemy might appeal from such a papal sentence, because an enemy may seek redress for personal injury received, therefore all the more might he seek redress for a wrong committed against God, if the reason holds. I ask you therefore to state how one may reply to these objections.

Master: To the first one someone might respond that the authorities cited above do suggest that a wrong done to God must be punished by prelates. They also show that all catholics have the duty to react towards a wrong committed against God to the extent that this is permitted by and pertinent to the status and office of every single individual. And therefore to appeal from an unjust sentence is not only pertinent to prelates but also to subjects. For by the very fact that spiritual leaders must punish a wrong committed against God it would be permitted to subjects (assuming they can do no more or that doing more is incompatible with their status) to appeal from such a sentence, because it is a lesser matter to appeal than to inflict punishment. Therefore if prelates must inflict punishment upon those who commit a wrong against God, it would be permitted to subjects to appeal from the sentence we are discussing. The response to the second objection is that the reason in question does not prove that someone is bound to appeal from such a sentence except when he cannot conveniently resist this injustice by any means other than an appeal, in which case it is conceded that an appeal from such a sentence is necessary. And the theorists who say that it is not necessary to appeal from such an unjust sentence do not wish to imply that there is no situation where an appeal is necessary, but that it is not necessary to do this as a rule, because when a regular appeal from some unjust sentence is necessary this is done so as to prevent such a sentence from becoming legally conclusive. Indeed for this very motive it is never necessary to appeal from a sentence rendered against the faith. But another circumstance might necessarily impose upon someone a duty to appeal, for instance, if it were not otherwise possible to oppose such an unjust sentence because of the malice or negligence or incompetence of others, or due to some other cause. A possible response to the third objection is that if there was no one save a criminal and disgraced individual who would want to defend the cause of faith against a pope proclaiming that the Christian faith is false, it would be permitted to criminal and disgraced individuals to appeal from such a sentence and to follow up on their appeal, and such individuals would have to be granted a legal hearing. Furthermore, the same point in support of the Christian faith might be made about its enemies. Nevertheless enemies of the faith may not be accepted as witnesses. And if there were others of good reputation and not enemies of the faith, the enumerated categories of people would not have the right to a legal hearing if they appealed from such a sentence against the faith. But these reprobates would have the right to be heard if they sought redress for a personal injury, because there would be no others seeking redress on their behalf.