WHAT IS A HERESY?
CAN THE POPE MAKE A NEW ARTICLE OF FAITH?
CHAPTER 13
Student Those two arguments seem plausible, yet the conclusion is difficult for me to hold. If some people affirm the opposite, therefore, would you please set it forth.
Master There are some people who say that just as with respect to those things that pertain to our faith and do not depend on human will, the highest pontiff can not, nor can even the whole church of God, make true an assertion that is not true nor false an assertion that is not false, so he can not make catholic an assertion that is not catholic nor heretical an assertion that is not heretical; and therefore he can not make a new article of faith nor in any way at all make a heresy of what is not a heresy, because just as without any approval by the church catholic truths are immutable and immutably true by the very nature of things so they should be regarded as immutably catholic, and similarly just as heresies are false without any condemnation by the church so they are heresies without any condemnation by the church.
Student That opinion attracts me more, and so if it can be confirmed by arguments do not hesitate to bring them forward.
Master That opinion is shown by a few arguments of which the first is this. [A] If any truth is catholic it should be called catholic [Ai] either because it has been revealed by God, [Aii] or because it is contained in the divine scriptures, [Aiii] or because it has been accepted by the universal church, [Aiv] or because it follows from those things or some of those things that have been divinely revealed and found in the divine scriptures and accepted by the universal church, [Av] or because it has been approved by the highest pontiff.
[Ai] Now if some truth is catholic because it has been revealed by God and that divine revelation does not depend on the approval of the highest pontiff nor on the approval of the whole church, the approval of the highest pontiff, in that case, adds nothing to the fact that such a truth is truly catholic.
[Aii] If the second is granted, namely that some truth is catholic because it is inserted in the divine scriptures, and it is certain that the insertion of such a truth in the divine scriptures does not depend on any approval by the church or pope, that truth should therefore be numbered among catholic truths without any such approval.
[Aiii] If the third is granted, namely that some truth is catholic because it has been accepted by the universal church, it should be asked why the universal church receives such a truth: [Aiiia] either because it is divinely revealed to it or also inspired in it, and then it is truly catholic without such acceptance by the church because it is divinely revealed or even inspired; [Aiiib] or the universal church accepts it because it finds it in the divine scriptures, and then again it should be judged as catholic without any such acceptance; [Aiiic] or the universal church accepts it because it knows it by experience or natural reason - which can not be said about many catholic truths - and then also in making some truth catholic the church would be relying on reason or experience, and this can not be said. For it would follow that the universal church could add every geometrical truth and everything else proved demonstratively by any science at all to catholic truths; from this it would follow that the universal church could count as among the heresies all false assertions of this kind that were contrary to naturally known truths and could condemn as a heretic everyone who affirms any false assertion of this kind which is contrary to any naturally known truth, and this should be regarded as irrational. [Aiiid] Or the universal church accepts such a truth because it pleases it, and this can not be said because then the universal church would rely only on human will in accepting some truth and making it catholic, and so our faith would rest on on human will. Yet since the apostle affirms in 1 Cor. 2[:5] that our faith does not rest on human wisdom, much more is it so that it does not rest on human will. The universal church accepts no truth as catholic, therefore, unless it is revealed divinely or is found in the sacred writings. Such a truth, however, would be truly catholic even if there were no church.
[See Significant Variants, para. 5.] [Aiv] If the fourth is granted, namely that some truth is catholic because it follows from those things or some of those things which have been divinely revealed and inserted in the divine scriptures and accepted by the universal church, it is also clear that it can not be inferred from them more because of the church's approval. It would not be made catholic because of such approval, therefore, but it was catholic before that.
[Av] If the fifth is granted, namely that some truth is catholic because it has been approved by the highest pontiff, then it should be asked whether in approving the truth the highest pontiff relies on divine revelation or on the sacred scriptures or on the teaching of the universal church, and whichever of these is granted it follows that the highest pontiff does not make such a truth catholic by his approval, but he determines and defines that such a truth was and is catholic. Or in approving some truth the highest pontiff relies on his own prudence or will, and if this is said it follows that the truth should not be accepted as catholic because of this approval by the highest pontiff because our faith can not rest on the wisdom or will of a man.
It is clear therefore that no truth is catholic unless it has been divinely revealed or has been inserted in the divine scriptures or has become known to the universal church as a certainty or because it is inferred by necessary argument from any of those. None of these, however, is known to depend on the approval of the highest pontiff or also of the church. Therefore no truth can be made catholic through such approval, but through such approval a truth is designated as having been and being catholic. And so the highest pontiff does not make any assertion catholic or heretical, but by his approval he determines and defines truths that he approves as being and having been catholic and by his condemnation he determines and defines assertions that he condemns as being and having been heretical. And so he does not make a new article of faith but newly defines some article as pertaining and having pertained to catholic truth, and so even if such a truth is newly defined as catholic, it was nevertheless catholic before.
[B] A second argument is this. If some truth is catholic only because it has been approved by the Roman pontiff, it is as a result catholic [Bi] either because it has been approved either explicitly or implicitly by the Roman pontiff or [Bii] it is catholic only because it has been approved explicitly by the Roman pontiff. [Bi] If the first is granted, it follows that the Roman pontiff can not make a new article of faith from any truth that was necessary beforehand, because all truths divinely revealed, inserted in the sacred scriptures, accepted by the universal church and following from some one or some of those have been explicitly or implicitly approved earlier by Roman pontiffs. For they have approved the whole faith of the church and, as a consequence, have approved implicitly everything which follows [from it], because just as he who says one thing says everything which follows from it, so he who approves one thing approves everything which follows from it. [Bii] If the second is granted, however, namely that some truth is said to be catholic only because it has been explicitly approved by a Roman pontiff, such truths as "Christ raised the dead", "Christ was God and man", "God foreknows everything", and the like should not have been regarded as catholic unless they had been explicitly approved by a Roman pontiff, and it seems that this should be considered irrational.
And so it is shown by these arguments that the highest pontiff can not make a new article of faith and can not make catholic a truth that is not catholic. They conclude from this that a Roman pontiff can not make heretical an assertion that is not heretical because an heretical assertion contradicts every catholic assertion, and vice versa, because just as if one of [two] contradictories is true the other is false, and vice versa, so if one of [two] contradictories is catholic the other is heretical. But just as it has been proved that a Roman pontiff can not make catholic a truth that is not catholic, nor can he, therefore, make heretical an assertion that is not heretical.
[C] A third argument is this. If an assertion is reckoned among the heresies only because it has been condemned by a Roman pontiff or also by the church, this is therefore [Ci] because it has been condemned either implicitly or explicitly or [Cii] only because it has been condemned explicitly. [Ci] If the first is granted it follows that every assertion which can permissibly be condemned is now a heresy, because every such [assertion] has already been condemned implicitly or explicitly by the church and by the Roman pontiffs who by approving the whole of faith have condemned every contrary falsity. [Cii] If the second is granted, namely that any assertion is heretical only because it has been explicitly condemned, then the assertion, "Christ is not a man", was not heretical before it was condemned by the church, and they hold this as clearly irrational.
[D] A fourth reason, which seems demonstrative to them, is this. Every assertion is truly a heresy if a pertinacious defender of it is truly a heretic; but all pertinacious defenders of assertions which can rightly and legitimately be condemned by the church as heresies are truly heretics, even if their assertions have not in fact been condemned explicitly and in that exact form by the church; such assertions, therefore, should truly be reckoned among the heresies before a condemnation of this kind. The major [premise] is manifest because no one is a heretic except on account of a heresy to which he adheres. The minor [premise] is proved by texts from blessed Augustine who manifestly affirms, as we find in 24, q. 3, c. Dixit apostolus [col.998] and c. Qui in ecclesia [col.998], that those who hold a false and perverse opinion and those who hold something unwholesome and evil and refuse to be corrected are heretics; but any assertion that can rightly be condemned by the church is false, perverse, unwholesome and evil; every pertinacious defender of such an assertion, therefore, even if in fact it has not been explicitly condemned by the church, is truly a heretic. They conclude from this that the church can not make heretical an assertion that is not heretical, but, by condemning any heresy, the church determines and defines that it has been and is heretical.
part 1, book 2, chapters 1-17
Text and translation by John Scott.
Copyright © 1999, The British Academy
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