POPE FRANCIS - A HERETIC? ON THE PUNISHMENT OF HERETICS AND ESPECIALLY OF THE POPE WHO HAS BECOME A HERETIC WILLIAM OF OCKHAM Dial. 6 CHP. XLVII

9 July 2014 Pope Francis Received In Audience Kiko Arguello, Founder Of The Neocatechumenal Way. 

Chapter 47

Student: I do not think that stronger reasons than these two can be found in support of the aforementioned assertion. Therefore refrain from providing additional ones, and state how one responds to those, which have just been advanced.

Master: The answer to the first reason is founded on a distinction concerning doubtful matters. For just as there are distinctions to be made with respect to ignorance, and we read this in 1 q. 4 # Notandum [col. 422] (there is an ignorance of fact, and another of law, and as to ignorance of fact there is ignorance of a fact which it is appropriate to know, and there is another ignorance, that of a fact which it is not appropriate to know; and similarly as to ignorance of law, there is ignorance of natural law and ignorance of civil law), so likewise there is doubt about fact and doubt about law. And one kind of doubt is with respect to fact which it is appropriate to know, while another kind is with respect to fact which it is not appropriate to know. And similarly there is doubt about law which one is bound to know, and another kind of doubt, about law which one is not obligated to know.

On the basis of these points the answer to the first reason is that there are some doubtful matters which it is appropriate to know, and other doubtful matters which it is not appropriate to know. Indeed in those doubtful matters which it is not appropriate to know, one's superior must be obeyed, and this is the case Augustine describes in the words we earlier produced in argument. [1 Dial. 6.46] But in the doubtful matters which it is appropriate to know, one's superior must not always be obeyed. For if a king or someone else were to order the adoration of Mohammed or the observance of Jewish religious law, then even if a subject doubted whether such an order was disreputable and against the law of God, he would in no way be excused from mortal sin if he obeyed the order, in the same fashion that Jews and others can hardly be excused even though they do not know that they are doing wrong. A similar understanding holds, they say, with respect to the issue we are discussing: that if someone doubts whether one must obey a pope who orders that such an appeal or demurrer not be honoured, he is doubting concerning a matter it is appropriate to know, and concerning which doubt is unacceptable. For everyone capable of reasoning is bound to know that one must favour the divine law over any mortal whatsoever, and therefore one must become actively involved to a higher degree in a situation where danger threatens the divine law than where it threatens any mortal man whatsoever. Thus, everyone is bound to know that it is inappropriate to obey any prelate whatsoever to the prejudice and subversion of the divine law. Everyone is also bound to know that if such an appeal or demurrer did not have to be honoured before its illegitimacy was confirmed, the subversion of divine law might become an imminent threat. For a heretic pope might freely subvert the divine law with no resistance being offered, and establish a sect inimical to the catholic faith. That is why everyone is bound to know that such a command must not be obeyed. And therefore if the doubter obeys it he is not excused from sin, because he is doubtful where he must not doubt.

Student: It seems totally unreasonable to say that everyone is bound to know that such a command of the pope must not be obeyed, since few or none hold this position. But the matters that everyone is bound to be aware of are understood to be points of common knowledge, of which few are ignorant. Therefore not everyone is bound to know that one must not obey such a command of the supreme pontiff. This also appears capable of being proved by the following reason. Propositions relevant to morals which everyone is bound to know pertain either to natural law or to divine law, while those propositions which stem from positive [human] law not everyone is bound to know. But not to obey such a command does not pertain to natural law because in that case it would be naturally known; nor does it pertain to divine law, because divine law is contained in the Scriptures, and there is no mention of this proposition in the whole of Holy Writ, therefore it does not pertain to divine law.

Master: The answer is that just as human nature has been corrupted by sin, so likewise in many people human understanding has been completely lost as to many matters due to the operation of various vices. And therefore if none or few hold that one must not obey such a precept of the pope, this is due to the corruption of vices. For few people or none at all are to be found who are willing to incur the wrath of the supreme pontiff for the sake of truth. If on the other hand the supreme pontiff were to hold this, all or many would hardly harbour any doubts about it. But if they had the will to consult their consciences, they would discover the obligatory position that no mortal is to be obeyed in subversion of the divine law, and consequently that one must in no way obey such a command of the pope since it may be in subversion of the divine law.

However, when you say that propositions relevant to morals that everyone is bound to know pertain either to natural law or to divine law, one agrees that this is true in a certain sense. For they are principles or conclusions of natural or divine law, or follow simultaneously from natural and divine law. This is the status of the assertion 'one must not obey such a command of the pope', because it follows from premisses dictated by natural law and from certain points contained in the divine law. For we know by natural law that anyone must place the law he deems divine above every human individual. And we know by divine law that the Christian law is divine law. Therefore by combining reason and divine law we know that the Christian law must be placed ahead of every man, and consequently that no command of the pope which detracts from or subverts the Christian law must in any way be obeyed, and so this proposition pertains somehow to both natural and divine law.

But where you say that it does not pertain to natural law because in that case it would be naturally known, the answer is that this is not true, because many propositions pertain to the natural law as conclusions, which are not naturally known. And when you say that there is no mention of this proposition in the divine law, the answer is that there is no explicit verbal mention of it in the divine law, and yet it is contained in the divine law implicitly, as a conclusion.

Student: State how one responds to the second reason.

Master: The answer is that it is not generally true that no clerk is permitted to withdraw from his bishop prior to sentence having been passed on the latter, witness the gloss [col. 686] to 2 q. 7 c. Sacerdotes [col. 484] which states: "if the prelates are heretics, or excommunicated, or do not observe the canons, or are simoniacs or notorious fornicators, then one may withdraw from them prior to sentence being passed, 19 dis. c. Nulli, [col. 61]16 last q. c. Sane, [col. 805] 32 dis. c. Nullus". [col. 117] It is clear from these words that clerks are permitted in certain cases to withdraw from their bishop or prelate before the passing of a human sentence on the latter, and so it is likewise permitted sometimes to withdraw from the pope before the passing of a human sentence on him.

Student: This response does not seem to be apparent, because although a clerk is sometimes permitted to withdraw from his bishop or prelate before a human sentence has been passed on the latter, he is nevertheless not permitted to do so before the law itself has imposed a sentence. Thus, if prelates are heretics or excommunicated or simoniacs or notorious fornicators, although human sentence has not yet been passed on them, the law itself has certainly sentenced them. But no sentence has been passed on the pope, either by law or by man, as the result of someone's appeal or demurrer. Therefore notwithstanding such an appeal or demurrer, the pope must be obeyed as before. And thus if he commands that such an appeal or demurrer is not to be honoured, he must be obeyed.

Master: One responds that according to the laws and to the dictate of right reason, a person is not simply allowed to withdraw from his prelate prior to the passing of a sentence by man or by law. Nevertheless, just as an appeal or demurrer frequently suspends someone's jurisdiction or authority, either with respect to some particular case or with respect to all cases, so may an appeal or demurrer suspend the pope's authority with respect to certain commands, namely so that he might not order something which would prejudice the appellant or the person issuing a demurrer prior to the case being decided. And just as such an appeal or demurrer suspends the authority of the pope with respect to commands which prejudice the appellant, so likewise all subjects of the pope who know that such an appeal or demurrer has been issued (although they do not know if the cause is legitimate) are absolved from papal obedience with respect to commands which prejudice the appellant or the person who issued a demurrer. And therefore just as the pope must not order at this time something which prejudices such an appeal or demurrer, so are his subjects in no way bound to obey him in this context.

Comments

  1. who are you to say these things.God will judge you for your actions.God bless Pope and everyone who serves him

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